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Introduction
In Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (PVA) ad Dharmakīrti s (ca. 600-660) Pramāṇavārttika (PV) [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] , following Dharmakīrti who accepted the Sautrāntika theory of atomism, attempts to explain how sense-perception arises form aggregated atoms. This portion of PVA is important since it is regarded as being presupposed by Prajñākaragupta s famous citrādvaita theory (PVA ad PV 3.208-222. cf. Inami 2004) .
This paper aims to examine Prajñākaragupta s discussion in this portion, focusing on his criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Objections to the Buddhist View of Sense-Perception
In PV 3.194-207, Dharmakīrti criticized opponents in order to defend his own theory that the object of perception is multiple atoms. First, he presented an objection Even though atoms occur in the same perceptual field, those multiple atoms are not observed simultaneously (PV 3.197ab. cf. Dunne 2004 : 397, Tosaki 1979 . Prajñākaragupta explains this objection in detail. According to his explanation , objections can be classified into two groups as follows: (A) a single perception cannot grasp multiple atoms simultaneously because the manas acting on a certain object cannot act on other objects simultaneously; or (B) the whole (avayavin) as the single substance should be accepted. This paper examines Prajñākaragupta s criticism of objection (A). The underlined part corresponds to Uddyotakara s view as expressed in his Nyāyavārttika (NV). In this portion of NV, he uses the example of piercing petals in order to prove that we cannot perceive multiple objects like the moon and a branch of a tree simultaneously.
Prajñākragupta rejects this view by indicating that nothing is proved on the basis of mere examples. Thus, Prajñākaragupta applies Dharmakīrti s criticism of Vasumitra s swiftness theory to his criticism of Uddyotakara.
The Criticism of the Prāpyakārin Theory
The reason that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika proponents advocate the swiftness theory in order to reject simultaneous perception lies in their prāpyakārin theory. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, visual perception arises after a ray emitted from the eyes (nāyanaraśmi), affected by the manas, has reached an object (prāpyakārin, cf. Akamatsu 1990). Therefore, the ray, insofar as the manas is single, cannot reach multiple objects simultaneously, but only one object at a time. If so, it is an illusion that the perception grasps multiple objects simul-taneously. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explains this illusion by the swiftness theory. In this way, the prāpyakārin theory is the basis of objection (A). Therefore, Prajñākaragupta must have rejected this theory in order to uphold his own position that perception grasps multiple atoms simultaneously.
In Prajñākaragupta rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika counter objection by indicating the example of the mantra that has no contact with objects. Further, he points out that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cannot regard a mantra as having contact because connection (saṃyoga) belonging to the category of quality (guṇa) cannot inhere in the mantra, a kind of sound (śabda) which is also a quality, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika s system (cf. VS 1.1.15).
Prajñākaragupta further explains the reason we cannot perceive a distant object from another viewpoint, as follows:
In that case, it would result that an [object] that is very close (atinikaṭa) can be grasped, since a ray of a lamp can affect an [object] that is very close. Therefore, it should be accepted that eyes and so on have different properties from those of a lamp. I was not able to find criticisms based on the mantra and the atinikaṭa in other Buddhist treatises which criticize the prāpyakārin theory, like Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā.
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Conclusion
In the present paper, the following points have become clear. First, Prajñākaragupta classifies objections by opponents against perception s simultaneous grasping of multiple objects into two groups: (A) a single perception cannot grasp multiple objects simultaneously, and (B) a single whole substance is the object of sense-perception. He attempts to prove simultaneous perception by criticizing both of these objections. Second, he criticizes the Nyāya- 
